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The Spatial Distribution of Geoprivacy Concerns in Florida: 
A County Level Analysis 
 
Joshua W. House 
ABSTRACT 
Certain types of spatial data maintained and distributed by counties at 
taxpayer expense can be used with powerful mapping and analysis software, 
called Geographic Information Systems (GIS), to compromise an indvidual’s 
locational privacy.  The kind of privacy at threat here is referred to as geoprivacy, 
which is concerned with the rights to prevent disclosure of the location of one's 
home, workplace, or daily activities.  While the availability of accessible and 
accurate geospatial data has increased geoprivacy concerns in recent years, this 
threat remains virtually unknown to the general public. 
Although previous research has explored various components of the 
geoprivacy debate, the fragmented and localized nature of this work does not 
adequately address the threat on a large scale or lend itself for use in multi-level 
policy discussions.  This thesis fills the need for a comprehensive and systematic 
geoprivacy study by examining county data availability in the entire state of 
Florida. 
Ultimately, the success of geoprivacy violation attempts is determined by 
the availability and quality of the data being used.  In order to evaluate this threat, 
v 
a statewide inventory of the data necessary for a reverse geocoding 
operation, defined here as geoprivacy data elements, was created.  A specific 
county (Bay County) with complete data availability was then selected and its 
geoprivacy data elements, specifically street, parcel, and address point layers 
were evaluated for their reverse geocoding and subsequent identity disclosure 
success.  These findings were then compared with the results of the statewide 
inventory to determine the level of exposure that the state’s residents are 
subjected to, based on their county’s data offerings. 
The statewide data inventory indicated substantial variation in county 
availability, quality, and delivery methods of the desired geoprivacy data 
elements.  The results of the reverse geocoding operation performed with Bay 
County’s geoprivacy data elements revealed that both property parcels and 
address points in conjunction with ownership information have a high rate of 
identity disclosure success.  Geocodable streets were found to have a low rate of 
identity disclosure success and their results were comparable to a non-county 
maintained street layer that was used for control purposes.  Although the street 
layers had a low rate of identity disclosure success, they could be used to identify 
a narrow range of address possibilities and still pose a geoprivacy threat.  Forty-
two counties in which approximately 13 million people reside make parcel data 
with ownership information available for free or purchase.  Given the high 
success rate of the parcel data to disclose individual identity, this research 
suggests that the majority of the state’s residents are vulnerable to potential 
geoprivacy violations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
1.1  Background 
 Advancements in the field of information technology have greatly 
enhanced the ability to acquire, analyze, and distribute information of varied 
content.  Although there are many benefits associated with such progress, it is 
important to also consider the risks, such as the potential for privacy infringement 
as there are “enhanced possibilities presented by information technology for 
collecting data about individuals without their consent” (Olvingson 2003; p. 183).  
The rapid pace of technological evolution can make it difficult to comprehend and 
effectively manage its collective impact prior to implementation, thus complicating 
privacy issues.  This makes the development of effective information technology 
privacy protection efforts and risk management strategies challenging, and in 
many cases, reactive. 
 One of the benefactors from developments in information technology is 
the field of Geography, specifically a branch called Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS).  GIS is described as “a computer-assisted process designed to 
acquire, store, analyze, and display spatial data and their attributes” (Dent 1999, 
p. 111).  A small sample of the many applications of GIS includes environmental 
modeling, epidemiology, urban planning, and emergency response.  Any subject 
that has a spatial component can somehow be served, or at least conveyed, in a 
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GIS. 
 Riding the wave of information technology, the rapid advancement of GIS 
and locational capabilities such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS) has 
resulted in the creation of vast amounts of accurate, accessible spatial data and 
analytical tools that did not exist until only a few years ago.  Although these 
advancements have helped society discover and analyze spatial phenomena, 
their inherent power has also raised concern over an individual’s right to 
locational privacy because some of the information available for use in a GIS can 
be used to disclose an individual’s identity.  This privacy subset is called 
“geoprivacy” and “refers to individual rights to prevent disclosure of the location 
of one's home, workplace, daily activities, or trips” (Kwan 2004, p. 15). Because 
of its ability to “integrate and analyze a large amount of geospatial data,” GIS is 
at the forefront of the geoprivacy debate. According to Kwan (2004; p. 15), “the 
potential of GIS to be far more invasive of personal privacy than many other 
information technologies has caused serious concern among GIS critics and the 
public.”  When the physical location of an event is tied to its descriptive 
information, the potential for privacy breach is exponentially increased because 
of its interaction with other spatially located phenomena (VanWey 2005; p. 
15339).  GIS data such as roads, addresses, and property parcel boundaries 
with ownership information provide the means to link the location of events, often 
conveyed through other, seemingly benign means, to an actual individual.  Such 
underlying data is commonly developed and maintained by government entities 
(at taxpayer expense) and made available for free download via the internet. 
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 Contributing to the advancement of the geoprivacy threat is a lack of 
public awareness regarding both sensitive data availability and how it can be 
used within a GIS to disclose an individual’s identity.   Therefore, the geoprivacy 
debate is occurring within a relatively small arena by only those who fully 
understand the gravity of the issue.  If made known, however, the full scope of 
available information as well as what could be done with it by someone skilled in 
the spatial sciences, the issue of geoprivacy would likely garner more attention 
and concern from the general public. 
 Although it is difficult to comprehensively assess the sensitivity of any 
piece of information, an example of that which would be deemed “private” is the 
location and identity of an individual with a certain disease.  Maps depicting 
locations such as points are commonly produced for medical studies aiming to 
discover spatial relationships among the afflicted.  However, “it is not widely 
known that such maps can be "hacked" to allow individual-level information to be 
recovered” (Armstrong 2005; p. 67).  If there is sufficient detail and fidelity in the 
map, the locations of the individuals can be extracted via GIS and spatially cross 
referenced with other data, such as property boundaries with ownership 
information obtained through a county website, to disclose identity. 
 It is certainly not the goal of the research community to compromise their 
subject’s identity.  The assurance of the preservation of confidentiality is not only 
consistent with ethical research guidelines as defined by the American 
Association of Geographers, American Psychological Association, American 
Political Science Association, and American Sociological Association, but also 
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“necessary to guarantee the continued participation of the public in censuses and 
social surveys” (VanWey 2005; p. 15337).  If the public perceives that their 
privacy is being breached, they will be less likely to participate in locational 
studies, effectively minimizing the potential public benefits that the study could 
provide.  A lack of effective research can lead to a lack of researchers so, for 
many reasons, it is in the research community’s best interest to maintain their 
subject’s confidentiality and trust. 
 Further complicating the geoprivacy issue is that the transparent nature of 
research (e.g., disclosing methods, sources, data) presents an additional source 
of vulnerability.  Research and the progression of knowledge requires outside 
parties validating, recreating, and building upon prior methods, data, and 
findings.  However, such efforts can compromise confidentiality as disclosure risk 
ultimately increases with access.  Even if access to sensitive research material 
was prevented, merely knowing which research entities were involved with its 
production represents a potential geoprivacy leak, as institutional knowledge can 
lend insight or provide an unprotected gateway to the private information (Van 
Wey 2005). 
 Guidelines do exist for disclosure of non-spatial medical and financial 
records, but universally accepted or effective rules have not been developed for 
spatial records. Where there are rules for spatial data (HIPAA) there is 
opportunity for disclosure as “the rule (HIPAA) creates an exception permitting 
disclosure of personal health information to public health authorities for public 
health purposes without such authorization” (Rushton 2006; p. S19).  Disclosure 
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is essentially governed by an individual privacy versus public benefit debate.  
However, with little public knowledge that these discussions are being held, the 
debate is one sided and can too easily conclude with a decision to compromise 
individual privacy for public benefit. 
 Limiting the jurisdictional power of research guidelines is that the 
guidelines only have meaning to those who aim to be accountable to the 
overseeing organizations.  “According to the concept of confidentiality, it is only 
possible to share data with others who are obliged to the same confidentiality 
concept and need the information in their profession” (Olvingson 2003; p.  181).  
It is likely that a great amount of geospatial analysis with sensitive data occurs 
outside of these organizational guidelines and is thus unregulated.  Media 
outlets, for example, are currently not subjected to the same guidelines which 
govern the presentation of locational information of health study publications 
(Olvingson 2003), yet their work (e.g., newspapers, newscasts) could 
conceivably reach a greater audience than an academic journal article and 
present a greater geoprivacy threat. 
 In an effort to mitigate the disclosure threat, several mechanisms and 
procedures have been developed.  These are referred to as masking techniques 
and they aim to provide adequate analytical capabilities while preserving 
individual privacy.  Given the subjectivities involved with determining what 
constitutes an adequate analysis, however, this is not an easy task.  What may 
be a suitable masking technique for one purpose may not be for another, 
because an “adequately masked” data set could be combined with additional 
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information or knowledge by a third party resulting in disclosure.  With technology 
making the distribution and acquisition of information easier and effortless, it is 
difficult to predict the intended and unintended uses of a mapping product as 
there are “many unforeseeable downstream users and uses” (Olvingson 2003; p. 
183). 
 In summary, there is an abundance of accessible, unregulated spatial data 
that can be used with powerful mapping and analysis software to disclose 
individual identity.  This threat exists and is virtually unknown to the general 
public.  Ultimately, the success of geoprivacy violation attempts is determined by 
the availability and quality of the underlying geospatial data as well as the ability 
to use such data in conjunction with GIS software.  With the increasing 
availability of high quality data and the advancement and pervasiveness of the 
software used to engineer geoprivacy violations, the geoprivacy threat will 
continue to grow if left unchecked. 
1.2  Goals and Objectives 
Although there is a growing body of literature on geoprivacy and its 
various components, most of it is field-specific and carries a technical tone that 
might be abstract, irrelevant, and inaccessible to someone unfamiliar with 
modern spatial technologies and venues for accessing related material.  
Moreover, the existing body of research is fragmented and difficult to be used “as 
is” to raise awareness of the issue and serve as a springboard for widespread 
discussion.  In addition, previous research has largely been localized, focusing 
on specific towns, census tracts, or individual counties.  These delimiters, while 
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certainly valid for their respective purposes, do not fully explore the nature, 
extent, and magnitude of the geoprivacy threat. 
 To address the need for a more comprehensive, systematic, and tangible 
assessment of geoprivacy, the state of Florida and its counties serve as the 
study area for this thesis project.  Florida is an appropriate setting for a 
geoprivacy study of this scope because of two reasons: 
1) Florida, its counties, and estimated 18 million residents (US Census 
Bureau 2006) provides a geographical context that is well-known, has 
jurisdictional significance, and appeals to a large audience. 
2) Florida’s Public Records Law states that government records, including 
computer records and subsequently GIS data, are public information 
(Florida Statues, Ch. 119, AGO 89-39).  Although a public record 
preparation fee can be assessed (Florida Statutes, Section 
119.07(4)(d)), several counties make their GIS data available for free 
download via the internet as "providing access to public records is a 
duty of each agency" (Florida Statues, Section 119.01(1).  Some of the 
GIS data that is made available by Florida government entities is 
suitable for use in a reverse geocoding / map hacking process. 
These two factors provide an important basis for investigating the following 
research questions: 
1) In what manner does the availability of certain types of information 
necessary to engineer geoprivacy violations influence its success? 
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2) To what extent are Florida counties and its inhabitants at risk for 
geoprivacy violations? 
By investigating these questions, the thesis documents and analyzes the 
geoprivacy threat in a systematic manner that is easily understood yet grounded 
in sound research practices; ultimately lending itself for use in policy discussions 
at all levels throughout the state of Florida. 
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2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a detailed summary of several key aspects of 
geoprivacy and associated methodologies.  It is important to consider that the 
range of geoprivacy research is rather broad and encompasses several 
techniques, issues, and practices.  While practices such as mobile phone 
tracking and video monitoring are relevant, this thesis focuses primarily on the 
risks associated with the display of point data.  The scope of the geoprivacy 
threat, however, is not limited to what is presented in this specific study and 
accompanying methodology. 
2.1 Geocoding 
Locational studies typically aim to determine if there is an association 
between an entity and its proximity to an event.  The questions researchers try to 
answer is: where do the subjects live, and is there anything acting upon them 
that is related to the factor(s) being investigated?  These questions can be 
explored using the powerful mapping and spatial analysis capabilities of GIS 
(Geographic Information Systems). One of the many functions available in GIS is 
a process called Geocoding, which can best be described as “the practice of 
assigning a geographic identifier to a computer record that lacks it, thereby tying 
information to geographic space.”  (Rushton 2006; p. S16)  This process is 
widely used in locational research (Brownstein 2006; p. 2) as the subjects’ need 
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to first be located, typically from address information obtained by the 
researcher(s), before analysis with other spatial phenomena can begin. 
The geocoding process is accomplished by using GIS software in 
conjunction with reference data that serves as an underlying framework for the 
assignment of a real world geographic identifier.  Such reference data is 
available from a variety of sources and exists as either a line, polygon, or point.  
A further explanation of this reference data and how it is used in the geocoding 
process to assign addresses is provided below: 
Line (street network based) – a spatially referenced GIS “layer” which 
depicts streets as individual line segments.  Information such as the street 
name, address range, etc. are assigned to each line segment in the street 
layer’s attribute table.  Addresses are identified by using geocoding 
algorithms that attempt to locate the address(es) of interest on the 
underlying street network.  This is conceptually performed by searching for 
the components of the desired address (Street Number, Street Name, 
City, State, Zip) and then using the address range information inherent to 
the line to locate the desired street number by means of linear 
interpolation along that street segment. 
Polygon (parcel based) – a spatially referenced GIS “layer” depicting the 
boundaries of property parcels.  These parcels correspond to ownership 
boundaries and have the address(es) assigned in the layer attributes of 
each parcel.  This information, in turn, can be used by the mapping 
software to locate or assign an address. 
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Point (address point based) – a spatially referenced GIS “layer” which 
denotes an address as a discrete point location.  This represents the 
highest level of accuracy for address information.  Addresses are encoded 
into the layer attributes which is used by the mapping software to locate or 
assign an address. 
Once geocoded, the subjects can be viewed and analyzed in conjunction 
with other spatial data.  This is the power of GIS; locating, integrating, and 
analyzing spatial data of varied themes.  While of great benefit to a researcher 
who is looking to determine if high rates of cancer are related to residential 
proximity to toxic waste facility, the very same tools used to answer such 
questions can be used in conjunction with data containing personal information to 
disclose identity. Evaluations of geocoding methods and their effectiveness have 
provided mixed results.  An assessment of the capabilities of firms that offer 
geocoding services (line / street network based) resulted in high variability 
among their products, pointing to the quality of the reference information used as 
well as the tolerances used for determining what constitutes a match  (Whitsel 
2006; p. 8).  In addition, the geographic characteristics of the population being 
geocoded plays a role in geocoding success.  Cayo’s 2003 study, “Positional 
error in automated geocoding of residential addresses,“ examined the effect of 
population density on geocoding accuracy (line / street network based) and 
observed that rural addresses were less accurately located than more urban 
areas.  Sources of geocoding error include inaccurate geometry, inaccurate 
attributes, and inaccurate ranging and there is also an accuracy tradeoff due to 
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the matching tolerances applied during the geocoding process (Rushton 2006; p. 
S17-S18). 
Despite the limitations of geocoding, it is possible to locate addresses in 
accurate manner. Prior studies such as Cayo (2003), Whitsel (2006), and 
Rushton (2006) cite the significance of accurate base data and consistent 
address formatting of the input and reference data as determinants of geocoding 
success.  Both Whitsel (2006) and Cayo (2003) proclaim the increased accuracy 
of using polygon / parcel based geocoding which “is expected to grow over time 
as high quality, parcel-level databases become more uniformly available across 
larger study areas” (Whitsel 2006; p. 10). 
2.2 Reverse Geocoding (also known asinverse 
geocoding or map hacking) 
The functionality of geocoding, which spatially locates addresses using 
underlying reference information such as street lines, parcel polygons, and 
address points is a critical component of many locational studies.  In addition to 
providing geocoding capabilities, GIS software can also be used to determine the 
location of a feature that has been mapped (in hardcopy or other form outside of 
a GIS environment) but does not have a real world location or assigned address. 
 This process is known as reverse geocoding or map hacking  (Rushton 2006; p. 
S19). 
Curtis’ 2006 study, “Spatial confidentiality and GIS: re-engineering 
mortality locations from published maps about Hurricane Katrina” portrays a 
common reverse geocoding scenario whereby a published map is scanned, 
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georeferenced, and the features of interest digitized to determine real world 
locations.  Once real world locations, or coordinates, have been assigned, these 
features can then be linked and analyzed in a variety of ways to and with other 
data; both geographic and non-geographic. 
In Curtis’ study, reverse geocoding was performed on a map that was 
published in the Baton Rouge Advocate newspaper.  This map displayed 
Hurricane Katrina mortalities as point locations and used census tract boundaries 
as a background reference theme to provide the reader with an idea of where the 
mortalities occurred.  This map was clipped from the newspaper, scanned, and 
then georeferenced to an existing GIS layer of census tract boundaries.  The 
point locations were then digitized from the scanned and georeferenced map, 
which gave the features that were once merely dots on a map in a newspaper 
real world coordinates. 
To determine the accuracy of the reverse geocoding process, the real 
world coordinates of the digitized features were then compared with GPS 
measurements of homes in which mortalities occurred.  Given that the published 
map and the georeferencing target were of a common theme, (census 
boundaries), there was a high success rate of reverse geocoding them to their 
true location. The goal of Curtis’ research was to evaluate the accuracies of the 
reverse geocoding process, which proved to be high.  Adding to the success of 
reverse geocoding is the presence of additional themes on the map such as 
political boundaries and roads.  These greatly assist in the reverse geocoding 
process as they provide a common link for georeferencing.  “The general point is 
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that layers or themes potentially displayable on a map add to the security threat” 
(VanWey 2005; p. 15540).  These themes lend the location of the study to being 
vulnerable to general geographic knowledge of the area as physical indicators 
such as coastlines, rivers, streets, and topography could give away the location 
(Armstrong 1999). 
Of course, not every single map lends itself to successful reverse 
geocoding: “contributing factors in the successful re-engineering of information 
from a cartographic display is the published map's scale, the size (and quality) of 
the published map, the projection used, and the accuracy (or error) in the initial 
mapping of the points” (Curtis 2006; p. 2).  These items, in conjunction with other 
information displayed on the map as well as the availability of the information that 
is used in the georeferencing process ultimately govern a map’s hacking 
potential (VanWey 2005). However, if the maps used in reverse geocoding 
“accurately depict locations, they can be used to recover individual-level 
information such as an address” (Rushton 2006; p. S19).  It is the map’s 
accuracy that is paramount; factors such as resolution are not as significant 
assuming the map also has moderate visual clarity.  Brownstein’s 2006 study of 
the effect of map resolution on reverse geocoding success determined that “the 
home addresses of many of these patients could be discovered, despite the low 
resolution of the disease maps”  (Brownstein 2006; p. 2). 
The significance of these findings is that it is possible to use GIS to tie 
these reverse geocoded or hacked locations to other spatial data, such as 
property ownership parcels.  This type of information is commonly distributed free 
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of charge from county maintained websites.  If this data contains ownership 
information it can be spatially cross-referenced to the reverse geocoded features, 
resulting in identity disclosure. 
2.3 Masking 
Given the vulnerabilities associated with mapping individual locations, 
researchers have worked to develop methods to protect individual locational 
privacy while at the same time allowing valid spatial analysis to be performed.  
These methods are referred to as geographic masks or masking.  “The goal of 
these masks is to modify the geographic information sufficiently to prevent 
disclosure of individual identities, while retaining enough spatial accuracy for 
geographic trends, clusters, or other patterns to be detected” (Rushton 2006; p. 
S20). 
Armstrong provided a comprehensive summary of masking techniques in 
his 1999 work, “Geographically Masking Health Data to Preserve Confidentiality.” 
 A description of these masks and how they affect data are described below.  
Where applicable, a graphic is provided to assist with understanding the masking 
concept: 
Displacement using translation (Figure 1) – moves “each point from its 
original location by a fixed increment.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 502)  This 
results in a uniform shift of the entire data set. 
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Figure 1. Displacement Using Translation 
 
Scaling (Figure 2) – this mask “changes both the distance from the origin 
of the co-ordinate system (thus executing a displacement) as well as the 
distances between point locations.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 502)  This results 
in a uniform shift of the entire data set as well as a fixed increase or 
decrease in the distance between each feature. 
Figure 2. Scaling 
 
Rotation (Figure 3)– simply rotates “each point by a fixed angle about a 
pivot point.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 502)  This results in a uniform “twist” of 
the data at a specified rotation point. 
Figure 3. Rotation 
 
Concatenated Mask – using any combination of displacement, scaling, 
and rotation masks in conjunction with one another.  (Armstrong 1999; p. 
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503) 
Random Perturbation (Figure 4) – displaces “each point by a randomly 
determined amount, and in a randomly determined direction, specific to its 
original location.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 504) 
Figure 4. Random Perturbation 
 
Point Aggregation – this technique “uses a single location to represent a 
defined subset of the original locations.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 506)  An 
example would be to use one point to depict that several incidences of 
cancer occurred within the greater vicinity of that point, but not at that 
discrete location. 
Areal Aggregation – protects against disclosure by “enumerating the total 
that exists within a region.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 506)  An example would 
be to show the total amount of incidences of cancer that occurred within a 
census block.  
 
The previously discussed masking methods have dealt with altering the 
physical location or amount of information that is shown.  There are, however, 
other ways of protecting spatial data confidentiality that are based on some form 
of data access control, agreements among the parties involved, or alternate 
forms of display.  These include: 
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Enclaves and Cold Rooms – where data is made available for analysis 
at a physical location.  No data is permitted to leave the premises, and 
access can be restricted to certain individuals. (VanWey 2005; p. 15338) 
Virtual Enclaves - a computer network accessed environment where 
“restricted access to data can take place, without requiring travel, access 
fees, or delays before the results are available to the researcher”  
(VanWey 2005; p. 15341).  This is similar to the concept of an Enclave / 
Cold Room but the data user can obtain remote access to the data and / 
or results of the object in study. 
Software Agents – this masking technique involves remote access by 
using software to formulate data requests which are “sent to the original 
data repository, so the analysis could be done inside the original data 
repository and then a summary aggregate report sent back to the 
researcher” (Kamel 2006; p. 165).  In 1999, Armstrong discussed software 
agents in that “users would not be required to have access to confidential 
health records. Rather, they would submit a request to an intelligent 
analysis agent that would assess the request, and if found appropriate, 
would complete the analysis and return a result to the data user without 
exposing any individual-level health data (Kamel 2006). 
Virtual Institutions and Virtual Organizations – building on the concept 
of virtual enclaves, these are very generally described as a combination of 
data distribution and analysis services whose access is governed by 
means of pre-defined agreements.  These entities can function 
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independently or in conjunction with others (including software agents) to 
judiciously serve data needs (Kamel 2006). 
Privacy, Access, and Usage Agreements – specific agreements 
outlining what can and cannot be done with the data. 
Reduction of Basemap Detail and Contextual Information – reducing 
the amount ancillary information displayed on a map (political boundaries, 
roads, descriptions) so that the possibility for identification of the study 
area is minimized. 
Abstract Methods (spider plots, graphs) – displays spatial information in 
a manner whereby geographical relationships are effectively 
communicated but not explicitly presented in a conventional mapping 
format. 
Omission - not using or limiting the use of maps for publication purposes. 
  
The implementation of any masking technique will ultimately result in 
some type of information loss when compared to the original data.  However, the 
information which is lost at the hands of masking might not be necessary for the 
objectives and subsequent accuracy needs of an analysis (Rushton 2006; p. 
S20).  Kwan’s 2004 study, “Protection of Geoprivacy and Accuracy of Spatial 
Information: How Effective Are Geographical Masks?” evaluated how the degree 
of random perturbation affected accuracy.  A masking threshold value was 
discovered at which the masked results differ substantially from the non-masked 
data.  Results below the threshold were deemed adequate for the analysis.  This 
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suggests that it is possible to use masking and find balance between information 
loss and accuracy needs. 
Despite the possibility for masking success, which is certainly a subjective 
decree, a universally accepted solution that could be implemented on a large 
scale (a scale which matches the amount of sensitive data that is easily 
accessible) has not been developed.  An evaluation of the masking techniques 
which alter the position of the original data (displacement, scaling, rotation, and 
random perturbation) suggest that “random perturbation is superior from a 
comprehensive information preservation standpoint” (Armstrong 1999; p. 512).  
Virtual solutions (enclaves, agents) are theoretically strong yet mostly conceptual 
in nature and implementation is complex.  Real enclaves are believed to carry 
the lowest risk of confidentiality breaches (VanWey 2005) yet this may not be 
something that would be possible for all data producers to implement as the 
startup costs and continued management is prohibitive. 
Even with the application of a masking technique, a dataset is still 
vulnerable to being “hacked” if the masking method employed is discovered, if 
alternate masked versions of the same dataset are obtained, or if ancillary 
information (that may have been produced or disclosed afterwards by a different 
party) is used in conjunction with the masked data to reveal the original locations. 
 Unfortunately, “there are relatively few simple cases or simple solutions” when it 
comes to managing the geoprivacy threat (VanWey 2005; p. 15338). 
Despite the uncertainties involved with masking and effective 
implementation on a large scale, if disclosure risk is to be minimized it is “vital 
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that some masking occurs of the original point data.”  (Curtis 2006 p. 10)  This 
belief was echoed at a recent symposium hosted in part by the Association of 
American Geographers as “there was also a general concern expressed about 
preserving individual confidentiality within spatial displays. This concern is 
justified as map making, and the ability to deliver maps to a mass audience 
through the Internet becomes steadily easier [5-8]” (Curtis 2006; p. 2).  Providing 
further grounds for masking is that “administrative records and other information, 
sometimes obtained as an adjunct of newly emerging location based services, 
can be mapped and cross-referenced to reveal the identities and characteristics 
of individuals from information that is often available on-line” (Armstrong 2005; p. 
64). 
Lending further support for the need to mask sensitive data are the 
uncertainties associated with other information that is currently or will become 
available: 
“an experiment using 1990 U.S. Census summary data surprised the 
public health community by showing that datasets previously thought to be 
adequately de-identified, containing only 5-digit ZIP code, gender and date 
of birth, could be linked with other publicly available data (e.g., voting 
records) and used to uniquely identify 87 percent of the population of the 
United States [15]” (Brownstein 2006; p. 4). 
A seemingly sound masking technique can be foiled by something that is difficult 
to prepare for: the unknown. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The geoprivacy threat is real and it requires substantial research attention. 
 Understanding the nature and magnitude of the threat, however, is difficult given 
the fragmented and intangible nature of the existing body of geoprivacy research. 
 This study hopes to address this need by exploring the following research 
questions:  
1) In what manner does the availability of certain types of information 
necessary to engineer geoprivacy violations influence its success? 
2) To what extent are Florida counties and their inhabitants at risk for 
geoprivacy violations? 
These questions are explored by emulating how a “map hacker” could attempt to 
disclose the identity of non-masked, accurately mapped individuals using public 
domain data via a reverse geocoding operation.  This process was performed 
and evaluated based on the following steps: 
1) For all counties in Florida, determine the availability and quality of the 
geospatial data that can be used for identity disclosure to occur. 
2) Perform a reverse geocoding procedure to evaluate the capability of 
available county data to disclose identity. 
3) Investigate the relationship between population density and reverse 
geocoding success. 
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4) Explore the statewide implications of these findings by determining 
population exposure with respect to the availability and reverse 
geocoding success of the geoprivacy data elements. 
A more detailed description of this process and each individual step is described 
in the remaining sections of this chapter. 
3.1 Geoprivacy Data Availability 
Since geocoding and reverse geocoding require appropriate data, the first 
step was to perform a county-by-county inventory of the information that is 
necessary and typically used in these operations.  The data must have been 
made available through a county conveyance so as to be considered public 
domain. The availability of the following county maintained data, referred to as 
“geoprivacy data elements”, was determined: 
A. Geocodable Street Layer 
B. Property Ownership Parcels 
C. Address Points 
Given that there were some counties which did not have any of these data 
elements, a non-County source geocodable street layer (Census TIGER/Line file) 
was used to establish a baseline to which the other elements were compared. 
Another critical component of geocoding, reverse geocoding, and mapping 
in general is the availability of current and accurate aerial photography.  Although 
many counties acquire this imagery on their own and make it available for 
purchase or download, at the time of this study the US Department of Agriculture 
released imagery for the entire state of Florida whose acquisition date (2007) and 
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quality rivaled or exceeded what most counties typically offer.  Since a set of high 
quality aerials for every county in the state are now available for free download, 
the need to evaluate variability across counties was eliminated.   
 In addition to the mere existence of the geoprivacy data elements, factors 
such as accessibility, ease of use, completeness, and cost were assumed to 
influence the ability of the layers to be used in a reverse geocoding operation.  
These characteristics were used to develop a classification scheme that 
represented the final availability code for each geoprivacy data element. The six 
categories in this classification scheme are described in Table 1. 
Table 1. Geoprivacy Data Availability Codes 
Data 
Availability 
Code
Description
Yes Layer is available and can be obtained anonymously and without charge (includes parcels that must be joined to ownership table)
Purchase
Layer is available for purchase therefore payment information and in some 
cases a usage agreement is required (includes parcels that must be joined 
to table) and cannot be obtained anonymously.
Indirect Layer is available but difficult to obtain, use, or contact information and / or a usage agreement is required.
Ineffective
Layer is available but not able to be used for reverse geocoding and 
identity disclosure purposes due to a lack of addresses and / or ownership 
information.
No Layer confirmed unavailable (includes layers in process).
Inconclusive Layer availability unable to be determined.
 
Based on the classification scheme depicted in Table 1, the county geoprivacy 
data elements made available for each county in the State of Florida was 
compiled into: (a) a table that documents each county’s offering; and (b) a series 
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of county-level maps depicting the spatial distribution of geoprivacy data element 
availability. 
3.2 Evaluating Geoprivacy Risk 
In order to evaluate whether or not the aforementioned geoprivacy data 
elements contribute to geoprivacy risk, one county (Bay County) which has 
complete data availability (geocodable street layer, property ownership parcels, 
and address points) was selected and each geoprivacy data element was 
successively evaluated for its identity disclosure success. The subjects whose 
identity was targeted for disclosure were identified by randomly selecting 100 
address points which represent owner / occupiers of the property.  The address 
point layer is the most accurate geoprivacy data element and best represented 
an individual’s discrete location. 
With the test population identified, it was then mapped in a GIS 
environment, specifically ESRI’s ArcGIS, to provide the source material on which 
the reverse geocoding operation was performed.  A county scale map was then 
produced showing only the county boundary, major roads, and the residences of 
the mapped individuals (un-masked, of course) displayed as point locations.  The 
map conformed to a page size of  8.5 inches by 11 inches (letter size) and was 
printed on a conventional laser printer. 
Consistent with routine “map hacking” practices, the “published” map was 
then scanned at a resolution of 200 dots per inch (dpi) and geo-referenced in 
ArcGIS using the available source data (county boundary and roads) as 
registration points.  To determine the location of the residences as depicted on 
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the scanned and georeferenced map, the point locations were then determined 
by first creating a vector polygon circle that conformed to the areal extent of the 
circle representing the boundary of the point on the georeferenced map.  
Maintaining a constant capture scale, the boundary of each mapped residence 
(displayed as points) was determined in this manner, and resulted in one vector 
polygon for each mapped residence.  The discrete location of the mapped 
individuals was then determined by calculating the centroid of the digitized vector 
polygon circles.  This location represents the “hacked” location of the mapped 
individuals and was used as the common starting point for each identity 
disclosure effort. 
At this point the actual location of the individual’s residence as well as the 
hacked location had been established.  Given that no personal information such 
as name or address has been introduced, the possibility for identity disclosure is 
minimal assuming that the “map hacker” does not have any knowledge of the 
study area nor its residents.  To establish a control value, the distance between 
the hacked and actual locations was determined. 
The real-world address of the hacked points was then determined by 
using each of the data elements (geocodable street layer, property ownership 
parcels, and address points) and their corresponding reverse geocoding method 
in ArcGIS.  The assumption here is that a street address is needed for identity 
disclosure.  For example, a hacked location may place the point in the middle of 
a pasture.  This location is deemed to be of little value until a street address is 
assigned.  Since the real-world address is critical, the hacked point was then 
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moved via geocoding to the point on the reference data that represents the 
location of the address obtained through the reverse geocoding operation, and 
the distance the hacked point moved was recorded.  Finally, the distance from 
the hacked, reverse geocoded, and geocoded position to the actual residence 
was determined. 
After determining the distance from each hacked, reverse geocoded, and 
geocoded location to its actual location, summary statistics were calculated to 
analyze the various geoprivacy data elements and their corresponding 
effectiveness (measured in distance from actual location).  For all data elements, 
the number of alternate residences within the distance to the actual location was 
determined as well as an indication of whether or not the reverse geocoded point 
matched the actual address, actual street, or neither.  It should be noted that 
when ownership information is available, an address match reveals an 
individual’s personal identity.  A graphical depiction of this process, using the 
County Maintained Geocodable Street Layer Geoprivacy Data Element, is 
offered in Figure 5, Reverse Geocoding Workflow. 
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Figure 5. Reverse Geocoding Workflow 
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3.3 Population Characteristics and Reverse Geocoding Success 
Previous studies have indicated that population density has a positive 
influence on geocoding success when using line based, interpolation methods 
(Cayo 2003).  Highly populated areas, such as cities, typically have shorter 
streets and a more uniform distribution of addresses.  These two factors allow for 
the line based geocoding process, which utilizes linear interpolation methods, to 
more accurately predict address placement in urban areas than in rural areas 
where streets are typically longer and address distribution less uniform.  With 
respect to reverse geocoding, however, higher population densities offer an 
ambient level of masking as there are simply more possibilities (people) shielding 
the targeted individual(s) due to closer residential proximity.  It was thus 
necessary to look at the opposing influences of population densities, as this 
experiment involved both line based geocoding and reverse geocoding. This was 
accomplished by comparing the population densities for each geoprivacy data 
element’s reverse geocoded point as documented by its corresponding 2000 US 
Census Block Group value with its reverse geocoding success as measured by 
distance to actual location.  The results for each geoprivacy data element were 
displayed on a scatter plot and included R-squared values as an indication of 
linear association. 
After the determination of data availability, reverse geocoding success, 
and influence of population density, these findings were examined with respect to 
county population totals.  This comparison was used to obtain an understanding 
of potential exposure to geoprivacy in the state of Florida. 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1 Geoprivacy Data Availability 
The initial effort to determine data availability in Florida consisted of an 
internet search utilizing the Google engine (http://www.google.com).  For each 
county, three separate searches were performed using the following key words: 
1) Desired County Property Appraiser 
2) Desired County GIS Department 
3) Desired County GIS Data 
In addition to revealing the sought after data and contact information, these 
search criteria quickly returned a web site that catalogs links to Florida county 
GIS websites.  The information provided by this website was used to supplement 
the existing search criteria and help determine data availability. The websites 
retrieved from the search were examined for the presence of the three 
geoprivacy data elements: county maintained roads, property parcels, and 
address points.  Where data elements were found and freely available, they were 
downloaded and examined for their ability to be used in a reverse geocoding 
operation.  This examination was not only for the existence of address and 
ownership information, but also for any characteristic which impacted the 
usability of the data.  Traits such as difficult access, fragmented files, or the need 
to perform additional processing steps such as joining ownership tables to the 
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GIS layer, was documented.  The online search revealed a substantial amount of 
variability among all counties as to what information was available, how it was 
offered, and how it was described. 
For counties whose availability could not be determined from the online 
search, the best contact information (email, phone number) offered by the 
website was obtained.  For example, if there was a specific GIS or mapping 
contact listed, that information was determined to be the best contact and was 
pursued.  If there was no GIS or mapping contact, the general email address or 
phone number was used.  Keeping with the desire to remain anonymous, email 
contacts took priority over phone numbers.  Only one contact was obtained for 
each county mapping entity, which typically was the property appraiser and 
county GIS department. 
To fill in the gaps for counties whose data availability could not be 
determined from the initial web search as well as insure the findings of the online 
search, an anonymous email was sent to all counties which offered an email 
contact inquiring about the existence of the geoprivacy data elements.  The 
following is a transcript of the email that was sent: 
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________________________________________________________________ 
Hello.  Could you please inform me as to how I can obtain GIS information for 
your county?  I am specifically looking for the following layers: 
 
- Streets with Address Ranges (geocodable) 
- Property Parcels with Ownership Information 
- Address Points 
- Recent Aerial Photography* 
 
Is there a site (web, ftp) from which I can directly access any of this information? 
Any assistance you could provide would be greatly appreciated.  Thanks. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Aerial photography was deemed irrelevant due to the release of the USDA 
imagery, however the email request was sent prior to this conclusion. 
 
For counties whose best or only contact was a phone number, an anonymous 
phone call (*67) was made to determine data availability and consisted of the 
same verbiage as the email message. 
The data availability effort required 201 unique web searches, 68 emails, 
and 35 phone calls.  It should be noted that only one knowledgeable contact for 
each county entity, which in most cases was the County Property Appraiser and 
County GIS Department, was pursued.   With 67 counties in the state and 
typically two departments being responsible for the desired GIS information, 
contacting every conceivable entity to achieve absolute certainty would be a 
monumental task.  For the purposes of this thesis, it was determined that if the 
information could not be located by a thorough web search, email, or phone call 
to a knowledgeable source then the information is presumed to be difficult to 
obtain which provides some level of protection, intentional or not. 
Unexpectedly, there were a few referrals to county Emergency Services / 
 33
Management department(s) for street and addressing information.  The referring 
county staff did not give an indication of whether or not these departments would 
actually provide this information, just that they were the caretakers and to contact 
them for availability.  Given that these departments focus on providing 
emergency services to individuals in need and every moment of their time is 
critical, these contacts were not pursued. 
The outcome of the county data search revealed significant variability in 
both the availability and accessibility of the county maintained geoprivacy data 
elements (Table 2).  A review of the detailed county availability (Table 3) portrays 
Table 2. County Availability Summary 
Data 
Availability 
Code
Description Streets Parcels Address Points Total
Yes Layer is available and can be obtained anonymously and without charge (includes parcels that must be joined to ownership table) 18 15 12 45
Purchase
Layer is available for purchase therefore payment information and in some 
cases a usage agreement is required (includes parcels that must be joined 
to table) and cannot be obtained anonymously.
6 27 2 35
Indirect Layer is available but difficult to obtain, use, or contact information and / or a usage agreement is required. 7 5 10 22
Ineffective
Layer is available but not able to be used for reverse geocoding and 
identity disclosure purposes due to a lack of addresses and / or ownership 
information.
10 2 0 12
No Layer confirmed unavailable (includes layers in process). 1 0 9 10
Inconclusive Layer availability unable to be determined. 25 18 34 77
Total 67 67 67 201
 
this variability in greater depth.  Only seven counties make all three layers 
available for free, and only 12 have all three available for free or purchase.  
However, 24 counties make at least one county maintained geoprivacy data 
element available for free and 45 counties make at least one available for free or 
purchase.  Therefore, at least one county maintained geoprivacy data element 
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can be obtained for the majority (67 percent) of the state. 
Table 3. Detailed County Availability 
County Roads Parcels Address Points County Roads Parcels
Address 
Points
Alachua Ineffective Indirect Indirect Lee Yes Yes Inconclusive
Baker Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive Leon Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive
Bay Yes Yes Yes Levy Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive
Bradford Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive Liberty Inconclusive Purchase Inconclusive
Brevard Ineffective Indirect Yes Madison Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive
Broward Yes Purchase No Manatee Yes Yes Inconclusive
Calhoun Ineffective Purchase No Marion Yes Purchase Inconclusive
Charlotte Yes Yes Yes Martin Ineffective Yes Inconclusive
Citrus Ineffective Indirect Inconclusive Miami-Dade Inconclusive Purchase Inconclusive
Clay Purchase Purchase Inconclusive Monroe Yes Yes No
Collier Yes Purchase Yes Nassau Inconclusive Purchase Inconclusive
Columbia Inconclusive Purchase Inconclusive Okaloosa Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive
DeSoto Indirect Purchase Indirect Okeechobee Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive
Dixie Indirect Purchase Indirect Orange Yes Purchase Yes
Duval Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive Osceola Yes Purchase Yes
Escambia Purchase Indirect No Palm Beach Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive
Flagler Inconclusive Purchase Inconclusive Pasco Ineffective Yes No
Franklin Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive Pinellas Yes Yes No
Gadsden Indirect Purchase Indirect Polk Inconclusive Yes Indirect
Gilchrist Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive Putnam Inconclusive Ineffective Yes
Glades Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive Santa Rosa Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive
Gulf Indirect Purchase No Sarasota Yes Purchase Inconclusive
Hamilton Indirect Purchase Indirect Seminole Yes Yes Yes
Hardee Ineffective Purchase No St. Johns Yes Purchase No
Hendry Ineffective Ineffective Inconclusive St. Lucie Purchase Purchase Inconclusive
Hernando Purchase Purchase Purchase Sumter Purchase Purchase Purchase
Highlands Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive Suwannee Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive
Hillsborough Yes Yes Yes Taylor Inconclusive Yes Inconclusive
Holmes Ineffective Purchase Inconclusive Union Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive
Indian River Indirect Indirect Indirect Volusia Yes Yes Yes
Jackson Indirect Purchase Indirect Wakulla No Inconclusive Inconclusive
Jefferson Purchase Purchase Indirect Walton Yes Yes Yes
Lafayette Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive Washington Ineffective Purchase Indirect
Lake Yes Yes Yes
Detailed County  Availability
 
Despite performing an online search and attempting to reach the best 
contact for each county entity, the availability of elements for several counties 
was unable to be determined and were therefore deemed “Inconclusive.”  The 
availability of all three county geoprivacy data elements could not be determined 
in 17 counties and there were 36 counties with at least one data element whose 
availability could not be determined.  Despite an inability to determine what, if 
any, county maintained information is available for these areas, it is important to 
remember that non-county maintained geocodable streets are available for the 
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entire state.  The following map series (Figures 6 – 8) provides a graphical 
representation of statewide data availability. 
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Figure 6. Statewide Availability of County Maintained, Geocodable Streets 
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Figure 7. Statewide Availability of Parcel Data with Ownership Information 
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Figure 8. Statewide Availability of Address Points 
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4.2 Evaluating Geoprivacy Risk 
With the statewide geoprivacy data element availability determined, the 
next step was to select a pilot county for the reverse geocoding evaluation.  After 
the initial online search, only two counties had complete geoprivacy data element 
availability: Bay County and Charlotte County.  Bay County was selected as the 
pilot county because it offered a more robust suite of data beyond the geoprivacy 
data elements, included metadata, and had population characteristics that were 
more similar to statewide averages. (USCB 2006 Estimates) 
Following the county selection, the subjects of the map hacking effort 
needed to be identified.  The location of the subjects was conveyed by the county 
address point layer which, in the case of Bay County, is the most accurate 
geoprivacy data element.  To best emulate a scenario which targets residents, 
the county property ownership database was filtered to contain only those 
individuals who were listed as owner / occupiers of the property.  This reduced 
the eligible population from 78,090 to 22,755.   Of this subset, a simple random 
sample of 100 individuals were selected as the test group.  A limitation of a tool 
used later in this experiment influenced the decision to use a sample size of 100 
individuals. 
A county scale (1:316,800) monochromatic map was then developed in 
ArcGIS showing only the county boundary as a polygon, major roads as lines, 
and subjects as point locations (Figure 9).  This map was then printed with a 
conventional black and white laser printer on standard copy paper.  The 100 
point locations, or “incidences,” were then counted to ensure that none were 
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obscured by the other map elements and therefore able to be hacked. 
Figure 9. Published Map: Bay County, FL Incidences 
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The “Bay County, FL Incidences” map was then scanned at 200 dpi to a 
Tagged Image Format (.tif) file, a lossless file format, and georeferenced in 
ArcGIS using four road intersections as control points.  The incident locations 
were then “hacked” by digitizing polygon circles at a capture scale of 1:4800 and 
then determining the polygon centroid using the ArcGIS “Feature to Point” tool.  
The polygon centroid locations represented the starting points for all subsequent 
reverse geocoding operations and are referred to as the “hacked” locations or 
points. 
The different types of reference data used in this experiment (point, line, 
polygon) warranted the use of a different process to assign addresses (reverse 
geocoding) to the hacked points.  For the parcels (polygon layer) and address 
points (point layer) an ArcGIS tool called “Spatial Join” was used.  This process 
assigns the attributes (the address information) of the closest feature in another 
layer (the geoprivacy data element) to each feature in the target layer (hacked 
locations) and calculates the distance between the two. 
For assigning the address represented by the line features to the hacked 
locations, however, an ArcGIS add-in called ET Geowizards developed by ET 
Spatial Techniques was used.  Several internal ArcGIS tools and code samples 
were explored prior to making the decision to use this utility, but the ease of use, 
low cost ($195), and effectiveness of ET Geowizards made it an appropriate 
choice for this experiment.  This software utilized all available address 
components of the non-county and county maintained geocodable street layers 
to assign an address to the target point layer.  The hacked and reverse 
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geocoded points were then geocoded using the address information that was 
assigned from its corresponding reverse geocoding method.  The distance from 
these points to the actual point, or incident, and the number of alternates was 
determined using a free ArcGIS add-in (Hawth’s Analysis Tools for ArcGIS). 
The reverse geocoding analysis with the non-county maintained 
geocodable streets produced eight points that were not geocodable and one 
point which was an extreme observation at 42,419 feet with over 100 alternates 
(a limitation of Hawth’s Analysis Tools).  The county maintained geocodable 
streets produced one point that was not geocodable and three with over 100 
alternates.  The parcels produced only one point that was not geocodable and no 
points with over 100 alternates.  All of the address points were geocodable and 
had less than or equal to 100 alternates. The points that were not geocodable or 
had over 100 alternates did not produce results which could be compared 
quantitatively with the corresponding results for the other elements.  To allow for 
a quantitative comparison based on comparable sample size across all four 
geoprivacy data elements, the most extreme ten percent (10 points) associated 
with each element were excluded.   
Table 4 represents the summary statistics for the reverse geocoding 
effectiveness of the four layers and the initial hacked locations which serve as 
control values, and thus documents the accuracy of the initial map hacking 
process, prior to the reverse geocoding and geocoding steps.  In addition to 
standard descriptive statistics measures, the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) 
was used to evaluate reverse geocoding effectiveness.  This computation 
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measures the average magnitude of the error, giving a progressively higher 
weight to larger error values.  RMSE provides an indication of the consistency of 
the process being measured and has been utilized in previous studies of spatial 
proximity and accuracy (e.g., Zandbergen and Green 2007). 
Table 4. Reverse Geocoding Results 
Control
Summary Statistic 
(excludes 10% extreme 
observations)
Hacked Locations 
(no geocoding)
Non-county 
Maintained Roads
County Maintained 
Roads Property Parcels Address Points
Minimum (feet) 6.6 13.7 63.1 0.0 0.0
Maximum (feet) 81.3 503.5 357.1 93.5 51.3
Mean (feet) 39.8 144.1 132.8 19.4 0.6
Median (feet) 41.1 119.1 115.2 9.8 0.0
Standard Deviation (feet) 17.3 94.9 59.7 22.4 5.4
Root Mean Square Error 43.4 172.2 145.5 29.5 5.4
% Match Address* Not Applicable** 3.3% 7.8% 87.8% 98.9%
% Match Street Not Applicable** 66.7% 86.7% 98.9% 100.0%
Mean # Alternates 0.1 3.3 1.8 0.2 0.0
* When ownership information is present, an address match also reveals identity.
** The control value represents the initial map hacking effort, prior to address determination.  Geocoding was not performed therefore these
     measures do not apply.
Geoprivacy Data Elements
 
Table 4 shows that initial map hacking, as depicted by the values for the 
control “Hacked Locations”, was very accurate.  The RMSE from hacked to 
actual locations was 43.4 feet with the least accurate point being an extreme 
observation at only 81.3 feet away from its actual location.  Lending further 
support to the claim of high map hacking accuracy is that the mean number of 
alternates for the hacked locations was 0.1.  These values are surprising in light 
of the map’s small scale (1:316,800) and limited detail.  Furthermore, the map 
was reproduced twice (printing and scanning) prior to georeferencing and each 
reproduction presents an opportunity for errors to be introduced.  No geocoding 
was performed for the hacked locations layer as it served as the starting point for 
the reverse geocoding process and was a control value to which the other 
elements were compared. 
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The Address Points layer produced the most accurate results, with the 
RMSE being 5.4 feet.  This value is nine times greater than the mean of 0.6 feet 
and this disparity, although small in terms of real world distance, was influenced 
by the maximum value of 51.3 feet.  The address and street address match rates 
were 98.9 percent and 100 percent, respectively, rendering the address point 
layer extremely effective at identity disclosure. 
While the results for Property Parcels were also very accurate, these did 
not approach the accuracy of the address points, at least in a statistical sense.  
RMSE was determined to be 29.5 feet and match rates were 87.8 percent for the 
target’s address and 98.9 percent for target’s street.  The maximum distance to 
actual was 93.5 feet, a relatively short distance for an extreme observation, but 
the majority of the points were very accurate as the mean for all points was only 
19.4 feet and the median 9.8 feet. 
When examining the results for the Non-County and County Maintained 
Roads layers, it is apparent that these geoprivacy data elements do not approach 
the high accuracy values of the Address Points and Property Parcels.  RMSE 
values for the County Maintained Roads layer was 145.5 feet with an 
accompanying address match rate of 7.8 percent and street match rate of 86.7 
percent.  Results for the Non-County Maintained Roads layer were less accurate 
with a RMSE of 172.2 feet and address and street match rates of 3.3 percent and 
66.7 percent, respectively. 
Although many of the values for the road layers are several times greater 
than that of the Address Points and Parcels, it is important to process these 
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values in their real world context.  For example, although the RMSE value for 
Non-county Maintained Roads was nearly six times greater than that of the 
property parcels, the resulting difference in distance is only 142.7 feet; which is 
only a little less than half the length of a football field.  The values for mean 
number of alternates for the roads layers were nine times higher than that of the 
parcels, but determining location to within an average of 3.3 alternates for Non-
county maintained roads and 1.8 for county maintained roads still puts them 
reasonably close to the target. 
The distribution of values representing reverse geocoding success 
(distance to the actual location) are depicted by a box plot in Figure 10.  The 
extents of the vertically oriented lines represent the minimum and maximum 
distance to actual values, the extents of the grey box represent the upper and 
lower quartiles, and the horizontal black line which crosses the vertical line within 
the grey box represents the median value.  This was prepared to visually convey 
and compare the aforementioned statistical parameters. 
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Figure 10. Box Plot of Reverse Geocoding Success 
 
When examining the overall effectiveness of each element to disclose 
address and identity information, the summary statistics reveal a distinction 
between the road elements (non-county and county maintained) and the parcels 
and address points.  When looking at the statistics alone, an argument could also 
be made that there is a similar disparity between the parcels and address points, 
but when these numbers are considered with respect to their real world 
significance the differences are marginal as they are both highly accurate. 
Therefore, the parcels and address points were superior and similar in 
their reverse geocoding capabilities and the roads layers were inferior, yet also 
similar.  A cumulative frequency distribution (Figure 11) of the data elements and 
their reverse geocoding success illustrates the pairing between the data 
elements. Whereas all points for the Address Point and Property Parcel layers 
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are within 100 feet or less of the actual location, and most within 50 feet, both 
road layers exhibit a much more gradual, yet similar trend. 
Figure 11. Cumulative Frequency Distribution of Data Elements 
and Reverse Geocoding Success 
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Although the roads were less effective in disclosing the actual address 
and do not have the capability to inherently reveal identity as do parcels, it should 
be noted that the mean number of alternates for both road data elements is still a 
remarkably small number: 3.3 for non-county maintained roads and 1.8 for 
county maintained roads.  Despite not being able to provide the certainty of the 
parcels and address points, these elements did produce very few alternates and 
should be thought of as an effective means of narrowing down address 
possibilities to a particular street with few alternates. 
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4.3 Population Characteristics and Reverse Geocoding Success 
Located in northwest Florida (aka the Panhandle) on the Gulf of Mexico, 
Bay County ranks 25th in the state with respect to population at 148,217 and is 
30th in land area at 763.7 square miles.  (USCB 2000)  This puts the overall 
population density of the county at 194 people per square mile.  Nearly 25 
percent of Bay County’s residents live within its largest municipality and most 
densely populated area, Panama City. 
To investigate whether population density influenced reverse geocoding 
success within the county, a greater level of geographic detail was needed than 
an overall county population density calculation.  Therefore, the county’s 87 
Census Block Group boundaries and associated population densities (Figure 12) 
were used to better reflect variability across the county.  Summary statistics for 
Bay County’s Census Block Groups are depicted in Table 5. 
Table 5. Population Density Bay County 
Summary Statistic People per Square Mile
Minimum 9
Maximum 5,338
Mean 1,686
Median 1,525
Standard Deviation 1,192
Total Population of Bay County: 148,217
Population Density - US Census Block 
Groups (per 2000 Census)
 
The population density value of the underlying the census block group was 
then assigned to each of the point locations of the test population (incidents) that 
were the target of this experiment.  This value was then analyzed with respect to 
the distance that each geoprivacy data element and associated reverse 
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geocoding method produced.  This correlation analysis is depicted on the 
following scatterplots (Figures 13 - 16). 
Figure 12. Bay County Population Density 
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Figure 13. Scatter Plot: Non County Maintained Roads 
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Figure 14. Scatter Plot: County Maintained Roads 
County Maintained Roads
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Figure 15. Scatter Plot: County Maintained Parcels 
County Maintained Parcels
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Figure 16. Scatter Plot: County Maintained Address Points 
County Maintained Address Points
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The results of the correlation analysis do not reveal any significant linear 
relationship between population density and reverse geocoding success for any 
data element.  This is a probable consequence of the success of the initial map 
hacking effort, which placed points on average 39.8 feet from their actual location 
with the least accurate point registering 81.3 feet.  Even in high density areas 
there can only be few, if any, alternates within these short distances.  An 
exception would be high-rise residential structures, but these are not prevalent in 
Bay County. 
Although low population density has been shown to negatively influence 
linear based geocoding, linear based reverse geocoding is a different process as 
it uses the street layer as a reference for determining the closest address to the 
target feature.  Linear based geocoding was used, but it was based on an 
address derived from the source layer based on proximity, not an interpolation of 
a known address along a line segment.  The address assigned via reverse 
geocoding may be incorrect, as is demonstrated by the low address match rates 
of both street based geoprivacy data elements, but it is an address that can 
reliably be used to locate the feature back to the closest address on the 
reference layer.   In summary, linear based reverse geocoding is not influenced 
in the same manner by population density as linear based geocoding, and in the 
case of Bay County population density does not influence line, point, or polygon 
based reverse geocoding success. 
Data availability, the effectiveness of each geoprivacy data element, and 
the influence of population density has been determined; but what does this 
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mean for the state of Florida?  As stated before, Bay County has population 
characteristics (total, density) similar to Florida county averages (Figures 17 & 
18).  This likeness along with the finding that population density does not play a 
significant role in reverse geocoding success permits the results for Bay County 
to be applied to all counties and suggests statewide vulnerability. 
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Figure 17. County Population 
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Figure 18. County Population Density 
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With population size and density not significantly influencing reverse 
geocoding success, it is apparent that data availability is the key component of 
geoprivacy risk.  Considering that address points and parcels can provide for 
successful identity disclosure, the state’s population (United States Census 
Bureau, 2004 Estimate) was totaled for each geoprivacy data element and 
corresponding availability code (Table 6).  This was developed to provide some 
insight as to the amount of people who, due to the data that their county of 
Table 6. Population Facing Geoprivacy Risk 
Streets Parcels Address Points
Yes 8,514,917 5,513,128 4,716,269
Purchase 912,839 7,519,229 211,446
Indirect 299,712 1,310,939 1,077,635
Ineffective 1,526,169 110,816 0
No 26,235 0 3,676,652
Inconclusive 6,183,176 3,008,936 7,781,046
Total 17,463,048 17,463,048 17,463,048
Population based on USCB 2004 Estimates
Population Facing Geoprivacy Risk
 
residence provides, are potentially exposed to geoprivacy threats.  As Table 6 
indicates, approximately two thirds of Florida’s residents live in counties that 
make parcel data available, and nearly half of those counties make it available 
for free.  Given the high success rate of parcels to disclose both address and 
identity, this is reason for concern as it indicates that majority of the state is 
exposed to a potential geoprivacy risk. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis explored a very imminent, yet relatively unknown issue 
affecting every citizen in the state of Florida, and perhaps elsewhere; geoprivacy. 
Two very important questions were explored, the first of which being the manner 
in which certain types of information necessary to engineer geoprivacy violations 
influence success.  The results indicate that if no masking of sensitive data 
occurs and reference material displayed on a map can be discovered or 
accurately replicated, reverse geocoding can be very accurate; even when 
working from small scale material that has been reproduced.  All geoprivacy data 
elements evaluated could be used to assign an address to a point which lacks 
one and can subsequently serve as a reference layer to locate that address 
accurately relative to itself.  The existence of parcel data or address points allow 
for a high risk of identity disclosure, assuming that address and ownership 
information is inherent to the data.  Non-county and county maintained roads 
exhibit a moderate to high success rate of identifying the target’s street and 
produced few alternates.  Although less successful than parcels and address 
points, both street layers pose a threat for address disclosure; albeit a less 
certain one.  The existence of county maintained roads does not greatly increase 
the chance for address disclosure when compared to non-county maintained 
roads and neither road layers suggest a risk of personal identity disclosure as 
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ownership information is not inherent. 
The second question addressed by this research was regarding the extent 
to which Florida counties and their inhabitants at risk for geoprivacy violations.  
Although the entire state is subject to the Public Records Law, there is 
substantial variability in the amount, quality, accessibility, and delivery methods 
of county maintained spatial data.  Despite these inconsistencies, this study 
suggests that current data availability and associated reverse geocoding success 
makes the majority of the state’s residents vulnerable to geoprivacy violations.  
The widespread accessibility of parcel data, its associated reverse geocoding 
success, and its lack of statistical association with population density support this 
claim. 
With these findings, this thesis makes a unique contribution to the existing 
body of geoprivacy research by creating a comprehensive forum that exposes 
the geoprivacy threat to a greater audience while retaining its academic 
significance.  It is anticipated that parties from various social, economic, and 
professional backgrounds will use this research to engage in geoprivacy policy 
discussions.  State and local government should consider the privacy risks that 
spatial information can create for its citizens and a debate which involves all 
parties should be initiated to address geoprivacy concerns.  Successful 
collaboration will result in a more effectively managed threat; allowing geospatial 
research and services to provide continued public benefit while simultaneously 
protecting the privacy of its subjects, which has been proven to be threatened by 
current practices. 
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It is important to consider some of the limitations of this study and explore 
related avenues for future research. An important limitation of this research was 
that statewide data availability and quality could not be determined with absolute 
certainty.  Several geoprivacy data elements (77 of 201) were marked as 
“Inconclusive” for several counties.  A more exhaustive effort to determine data 
availability could resolve these uncertainties. In addition to resolving the 
“Inconclusives”, an examination of the geoprivacy data elements that were 
available only for purchase would be needed to accurately determine their 
suitability for use in a reverse geocoding operation.  Although this was attempted 
to be resolved through careful wording of the data requests (with ownership 
information, geocodable, etc.), without first-hand knowledge the county 
representative had to be relied upon to accurately convey the layer’s capabilities. 
Another opportunity to add to this research effort would be to modify the testing 
population and sampling techniques.  One random sample of only 100 individuals 
from one county was used.  Additional experiments conducted with larger 
samples and/or samples from other counties using their geoprivacy data 
elements could extend the findings presented in this study.  Within these 
limitations, however, the methods used for this experiment are believed to be 
appropriate and the conclusion regarding statewide vulnerability conceptually and 
methodologically valid. 
Future research endeavors should approach the geoprivacy threat in a 
holistic manner and carefully explore policy alternatives for managing the 
vulnerabilities associated with making private data publicly available.  The 
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geoprivacy data elements used for the purposes of this thesis exist because they 
provide a service to the entities who commissioned their development.  By 
allowing public availability, this data also provides a benefit to many non-
governmental entities that use this information for purposes which are part of the 
state’s intellectual and economic engines.  Widespread data availability, fostered 
by the state’s Public Records Law, has created a complex scenario where there 
are concurrent positive and negative outcomes.  While personal privacy is the 
key concern addressed by this thesis, it is important to include these and other 
external, yet important, factors when addressing policy alternatives.  Such factors 
can only be identified, however, if all parties contributing to, knowledgable of, and 
influenced by geoprivacy concerns are involved.  This will require extensive 
engagement and collaboration between public officials, citizens, GIS 
professionals, corporate representatives, and the academic community. 
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